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ADMIRALTY.

Collisi6n-Liabilityof
g and its ow.-Both a tug and its tow are
liable for the consequences of a collision, when those in charge of the
respective vessels jointly participate in their control and management,
and the master or crew of both vessels are either deficient in skill, omit
to take due care, or are guilty of negligence in their navigation: The
Steam-tug Trgryinia Ehrman; Ehrman v. Curtis et at., S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1877.
Ship-owners, if their ship is without fault, are entitled in a cause of
collision, except where it occurs from inevitable accident, to full compensation for the damage their ship receives, provided it does not exceed
the value of the offending vessel and her freight then pending, and the
same rule applies where the injury is caused by the joint action of a tug
and tow, if it be so alleged in the libel, and it appears that both were in
charge of their own master and crew, and that each was in fault in not
taking due care, or was guilty of negligence or of unskilful or improper
navigation : rd.
Vessels in motion are required to keep out of the way of a vessel at
anchor, if the latter is without fault, unless it appears that the collision
was the result of inevitable accident; the rule being that the vessel in
motion must exonerate herself from blame by showing that it was not in
her power to prevent the collision by adopting any practicable precautions : Id.
AGENT.

See Insurance.

Ratification of Acts of.-S. was the agent of a gold-mining company
in working its mines in Colorado. He had no authority to borrow
money in its name, but did, in fact, borrow large sums. The president
of the company was informed of such -borrowing and of the amounts.
The company, however, failed within a reasonable time to disavow the
acts of their agent in so borrowing the money. Held, that the company
should be considered as assenting to what was done in its name: Union
Gold Mining Co. v. Rocky Mountain NationalBank, S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1877.
Insurance Comany-Reponsibility for Acts of its Agents-Special
Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1877. The cases will probably be reported in 6 or 7 Otto.
2 From J. Shaaf Stoekett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 46 Maryland Reports.
3 From opinions delivered at the January Term 1878. The cases will probably
be reported in 37 or 38 Michigan Reports.
4 From B. L. De Witt, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 30 Ohio StateReports.

5 From Hon. 0. M. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 43 Wisconsin Reports.
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Instructionsto General Ageents.-No company can be allowed to hold out
another as its agent and then disavow responsibility for his acts. After
it has appointed an agent in a particular business, parties dealing with
him on that business have a right to rely upon the continuance of his
authority, until in some way informed of its revocation: S'outhcrn Life
Ins. Co. v. .cCain, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
Special instructions limiting the authority of a general agent, whose
powers would otherwise be co-extensive with the business intrusted to
him, must be communicated to the party with whom he deals, or tha
principal will be bound to the same extent as though such special instructions were not given. Were the law otherwise, the door would be
open to the commission of gross frauds. Good faith rc(uircs that the
principal should be held by the acts of one, whom he has publicly
clothed with apparent authority to bind him : Id.
ALLEY.

See Municipal Corporation.

APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS.

When General Rule to be applied.-To make applicable the rule that.
in the absence of a specific appropriation of payments by either the
debtor or creditor, the law will appropriate them, there must be some
testimony tending to show that no such appropriation has been made by
the parties : Albert v. Lindau, 46 Md.
ASSUMPSIT.

Substitutionof Debtor-Promise- Consideration.-Thecomplaint was,
in substance, that on, &c., one M. was indebted to plaintiff in a certain
sum, and defendant was indebted to M. iu a still larger sum, and it was.
thereupon agreed between M. and the parties in this action, that defendant should pay plaintiff said first named sum, and be discharged from
that amount of his indebtedness to M.; and that plaintiff accepted defendant's said promise, and released M. ; but that defendant has mad
default in part, &c. Held, that the complaint goes entirely upon. the
substitution of defendant for D1. as plaintiff's debtor, and no recovery
can be had under it without proof of the averment that defendant, at
the time of his alleged promise, was indebted to M. in the sum which
he promised to pay plaintiff: Gaston v. Owen, 43 Wis.
Mere evidence that defendant made a payment for D1. to plaintiff, and
promised to pay the remainder of M.'s indebtedness at a future date,
and that there was, at the time of such promise, a subsisting executory
contract between M. and defendant by which the latter might probably
become indebted to the former-without evidence of the relatins of
the parties or the state of their account on the foot of such contract at
the time of the transaction-would not sustain a verdict for plaintiff:
Id.
Services between Partiesin the Relation of Father and Chid.-In an
action against plaintiff's stepfather, for labor and services performed by
plaintiff after his majority, under an alleged agreement by defendant to
pay what they were reasonably worth, one defence was, that during the
time of such services plaintiff lived in defendant's family as a member
of it, and performed the service in consideration of a home, clothing, &o.
The court, after instructing the jury that plaintiff could not recover
without showing an express contract of the kind alleged, further charzed
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that if they found, from the preponderance of testimony, that defendant,
on or about a day named, agreed with plaintiff to pay him for services
afterwards to be rendered, and that plaintiff, in pursuance of such agreement, rendered such services, then he was entitled to recover ; and that
the burden of proof wias on plaintiff to show both the contract and the
value of his services by a preponderance of proof. Held, that the charge
was erroneous in fhiling to point out the distinction between circumstances from which a contract may be implied, and circumstantial evidence
of an express contract, and in failing to inform the jury that an express
contract of the kind alleged "must be established by direct and positive.
evidence, or by circumstantial evidence equivalent to direct and positive":
Wells v. Perkins, 43 Wis.
ATTORNEY.

Substitution of - Notice.-The substitution of one attorney for
another in a cause is not complete and does not authorize any proceedings to be taken in the name of the new attorney until notice of his
substitution has been served upon the attorney of the opposite party:
Comfort v. Stockbridge et al., S. C. Mich., Jan. Term 1878.
BOUNDARY.

Settlement acquiesced in becomes binding, though not in fact correct.Where, by the title-deeds of adjoining proprietors of land, the dividing line is left open to be established by a survey or measurement, and
is thereafter fixed and marked by mutual agreement between them, and
they occupy to such established line for a period sufficient to create title
under the Statute of Limitations, such proprietors will be held to the
line so established, although it may not be the true line: Smith v.
McKay, 30 Ohio St.
Under such agreement, one of the parties, holding under a deed, and
in actual possession of part of the tract, is deemed to be in possession
of the entire tract described in his deed, up to the division line, there
being no actual adverse possession against him: Id.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE.

See Mortgage.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Special Legislation- Change of Name of Corporation.-The constitution of the state of Alabama declared that "corporations may be
formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special act, except
for municipal purposes." An act of said state was passed authorizing
the Wills Valley Railroad Company (a pre-existing corporation) to purchase the railroad and franchises of the Northeast and Southwestern
Alabama Railroad Company (another pre-existing corporation), and,
after doing so, to change its own name to that of the Alabama and
Chattanooga Railroad Company: Held, that this act was not unconstitutional and that the above provision in the constitution could not be
construed to prohibit the legislature from changing the name of a corporation, or from giving it power to purchase additional property: W1allace
v. Loomis et al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
CONTRACT.

Construction of, where guantity of Goods is named with gualification.
-Where a contract is made to sell or furnish certain goods identified by
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reference to independent circumstances, such as an entire lot deposited
in a certain warehouse, or all that may be manufictured by the vendor
in a certain establishment, or that may be shipped by his agent or correspondent in certain vessels, and the quantity is named with the qualification of 1 about" or "more or less," or words of like import ; the
contract applies to the specific lot, and the naming of the quantity
is not regarded as in the nature of a warranty, but only as an estimate
of the probable amount in reference to which good faith is all that is
required of the party making it. In such cases the governing rule is
.somewhat analogous to that which is applied in the description of lands,
where natural boundaries and monuments control courses and distances
and estimates of quantity: Brawley v. The United States, S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1877.
But when no such independent circumstances are referred to, and the
engagement is to furnish goods of a certain quality or character to a certain amount, the quantity specified is material and governs the contract.
The addition of the qualifying words "about, more or less," and the
like, in such cases, is only for the purpose of providing against accidental
-variations arising from slight and unimportant excesses or deficiencies in
number, measure or weight: 1.
If, however, the qualifying words are supple.mented by other stipulations or conditions which give them a broader scope, or a more extensive
significancy, then the contract is to be governed by such added stipulations or conditions: d.
Where there was a contract to deliver at the post of Fort Pembina,
eight hundred and eighty cords of wood, "more or less, as shall be determined to be necessary by the post-commander for the regular supply,
in accordance with army regulations, of the troops and employees of the
garrison of said post, for the fiscal year beginning July 21st 1871," and
where the post-commander, as soon as he learned of the contract, and
within four days after it was signed, informed the claimant that but forty
cords of wood would be required thereon, and forbade his hauling any
more to the government yard, Hel, that the quantity designated (eight
hundred and eighty cords) was to be regarded merely as an estimate of
what the officer making the contract at the time supposed might be required, and that the substantial engagement was to furnish what should
be determined to be necessary by the post-commander for the regular
supply for the year, in accordance with army regulations : I.
COrPORATION. See Agent; ConstitutionalLaw; Surety.
Defence to Action against-Forfeitureof Charter.-It cannot be
shown, in defence to a suit of a corporation, that the charter was
obtained by fraud; neither can it be shown that the charter has been
forfeited by misuser or nonuser. Advantage can only be taken of such
forfeiture by process on behalf of the state, instituted directly against
the corporation for the purpose of avoiding its charter, and individuals
cannot avail themselves of it in collateral suits until it be judicially
declared: County of Macon v. Shores, S. 0. U. S , Oct. Term 1877.
In a suit on a bond issued by a county, the objection that the corporation was not organized within the time limited by the charter is unavailing: Id.
Where a corporation has power under any circumstances to issue such
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securities, the bona fide taker has a right to presume they were issued
under circumstances which gave the requisite authority, and that they
are no more liable to be impeached for any infirmity, in the hands of the
hold6r, than any other commercial paper: Id.
InmIeaching the validity of Charter in a collateral proceedig.-The
courts are bound to regard a company incorporated according to all the
required forms of law, as a corporation so far as third parties are concerned, until it is dissolved by a judicial proceeding in behalf of the
government that created it : Laftin & Rand Powder Co. v. Sinsheimer,
46 Dld.
The plaintiff sued certain members of a corporation to make them
liable individually for goods sold and delivered to the corporation, upon
the ground that said individuals haa not been duly incorporated by reason of non-compliance with statutory requirements. Proof was offered
by the plaintiff tending to show that certain requirements, which the
plaintiff claimed to be conditions precedent to the incorporation of the
defendants, had not been complied with. The certificate of incorporation disclosed no error upon its face, and was authenticated in such manner as was declared by the statute under which it was made should
be sufficient evidence of the existence of the corporation. Held, 1st.
That the plaintiff stood in this case in the attitude of a third person to
the corporation, and could not by proof aliunde the certificate impeach
its corporate existence; 2d. That the- company was a corporation defacto
at the time the goods were sold and delivered to it by the plaintiff, and
its existence as a corporation could not be drawn collaterally in question:
Id.
COUNTY.
See Corporation; lunicipal Bonds.
COVENANT.
Grantee's Right of Action- Gonstruction of Deed- Covenantor, when
concluded by Judgment- Oustig Corenantee-.Noticc to Covenantorto
defend-Constructive Ouster.-Where land is conveyed to a minor, with
provision reserving the whole of said premises for use as a homestead
for his mother, himself and sister, until he arrive at the age of 21 years,
or until his mother's death within that period, he takes an interest and
present right capable of being so disturbed and infringed as to give
him an immediate right of action and of suing alone, upon a remote
grantor's covenant of quiet enjoymenti Mason v. Kellogg, S. C. Mich.,
Jan. Term 1878.
If the holder of a title guarded by covenant, has, when sued upon
a ground, which, if adjudged valid, would show a breach of covenant,
given proper notice to the covenantor to defend, a judgment against
himself, will, in suit on the covenant, be conclusive proof of a breach;
but if the covenantor was not adequately warned, and was not.in substance a party, the judgment in the prior suit is merelyprima facie evidence, and is disputable : Id.
Unless the record in the former suit, shows affirmatively that the
point actually adjudged is the breach now sued for, it must be shown
by further proof: Id.
Parol notice to the covenantor to appear and defend is not good. Considering the effect which the law gives to a notice, it is sufficiently near
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being a fact of title to be within the policy favoring written memorials
or titles to real estate : Id.
The verdict and judgment in an ejectment suit wherein the successful plaintiff elected to abandon the premises and receive their value,
rather than pay for the improvements, show a constructive ouster, and
are evidence of a breach of a covenant for quiet enjoyment. 11iiysical
expulsion is not necessary, compulsory surrender of a part of the value
being enough : Id.
TVtether Joint or Several.-If a question arises whether a covenant
be joint or several with respect to the covenantecs, that is to say, whether
parties claiming the benefit of the covenant must sue thereon jointly or
may sue severally, regard must be had to the interests of the covenantees
in the covenant. But this rule has no application to the construction of a
covenant, with respect to the obligation of the covenantors, in deterinining whether they are bound jointly, or jointly and severally, or severally
only, and the extent of the obligation: Boyd et al. v. Kienzic ct al.,
46 Md.
See Evidence.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Homicide-Sef-defence.-The right of an assailed party to selfdefence does not depend on his believing or not believing at the moment
that a call would bring some one else to interfere in his behalf, however
it might bear upon the fact of the reality of his belief concerning his
danger and his necessity to use the given means of defence. Except in
special cases, no private person is bound in law, even if called on, to
defend others: The People v. Lilly, S. C. Mich., Jan. Term 1878.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
See Mortgage.
Preference-Rights of Fife as Creditor.-Whatever remedy may be
had in the bankrupt courts, preferences to creditors are allowed by the
state laws: Jordan v. White et at., S. C. Mich., Jan. Term 1878.
The fact that delay and hindrance to creditors were caused and intended
by a debtor's transfer of his property, would avoid it even though for
value, if the purchaser was not a creditor, but otherwise if he was: Id.
A wife, the same as other creditors, may obtain preferences from her
husband as to debts diie her : Id.

EQUITY.

Remedy at Law.-Where, in an action on an agreement to abandon
a certain .business in a specified town, the plaintiff alleged a breach of
the agreement to his damage a specified sum for which he asked judgment, and then stated that, by reason of the defendant's insolvency, he
would be remediless, unless the defendant was restrained from further
violating the agreement, and prayed for a perpetual injunction ; and the
defendant answered denying the agreement : Beld, That the action,
though equitable relief was sought thereby, being primarily for money
and a personal judgment being claimed, was one in which the parties had
the right to demand a trial by jury: .Brundridge v. Goodlove, 30
Ohio St.
EVIDENCE.

S!e Surety.

Presumption-Burdenof Proof-Rule as to Criminaland Cit'il Cases
and Cases of Revenue Seizures.-Innocenee is*presumed in a criminal
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case until the contrary is proved, or, in other words, reasonable doubt
of guilt is in some cases ground of acquittal, where, if the probative
force of the presumption of innocence were excluded, there might be a
conviction ; but the presumption of innocence as probative evidence is
not applicable in civil cases, nor in revenue seizures : Lilienthal v, The
United States, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
In criminal cases the true rule is that the burden of proof never
shifts ; that in all cases, before a conviction can be had, the jury must
be satisfied from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the affirmative of' the issue presented in the accusation that the defendant is
guilty in the manner and form as charged in the indictment: Id.
_Fraud- lMitten M1isrepresentations do not exclude Oral ones.-The
fact that in a fraudulent transaction some of the false representations
were put in writing and delivered to the party, does not exclude proof
of oral ones previously made and relied on. Whether anything outside
of the writings was considered as representations still standing and
relied on, should be decided upon a view of all the circumstances:
Match v. Itnt, S. C. Mich., Jan. Term 1878.
Intieachig I'rty's own Witness.-Although the general rule is, that
a party cannot impeach the general reputation for truth of his own witness, yet he may prove the truth of any particular fact relevant to the
issue by any other competent testimony, in direct contradiction of what
one of his witnesses has testified, even where such proof may collaterally
show such witness to. be generally unworthy of belief: Smith v. Ehnert,
43 Wis.
Thus, in an action on a promissory note alleged by the answer to have
been without consideration, after plaintiff, as a witness for defendant,
had testified that the note was for the price of specified chattels sold by
him to defendant, the latter was entitled to show by his own testimony
that he was not indebted to plaintiff on account of such chattels when
the note was given: Id.
FORMER ADJUDICATION.

Judgment without Prejudie.-A judgment dismissing an action without prejudice to a future action is an entirety, aid, though it may have
been so rendered erroneously, it will not constitute a bar to a subsequent
action upon the same subject-matter: Wanzer v. Se , 30 Ohio St.
.. ow far conclusive.-The complaint prayed thdt defendant's intereit
in certain real estate might be adjudged a mortgage ; that deeds of partition between them might be adjudged void as against plaintiff; that
an account might be taken of their advances to plaintiff and of the
rents, issues and profits chargeable to them ; and that, upon payment
of any balance found due them, they might be adjudged to reconvey to
plaintiff. A former opinion and judgment herein (26 Wis. 465) directed that plaintiff " have judgment for the relief demanded in the
complaint, conditioned upon the payment of whatever may be due."
Held, that even if such opinion and judgment were rendered without
the court having its attention called to their effect upon the details of
the accounting between the parties, no rehearing having been asked,
they must control the present appeal so far as they apply : Wilcox v.
Bates and another, 43 Wis.
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Under such decision, the cause must now be considered as if the
deeds in question had never been executed, and no attempt had been
made by defendants to sever the trust estate or their administration of
it; such estate must be surrendered to plaintiff in entirety. upon payment of what may be due them on the foot of the trust ; and they cannot be allowed to account severally, each for so much of the property as
he held in severalty under the partition, without regard to the aggregate state of the account for the whole trust : .
FRAUD.

See Evidence ; Linitations, Statute of.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
See Assuapjsit.
Contrapt to be performed within a Year.-Although the parties may
be longer than a year in the performance of a contract, still, if that performance may be completed within a year, and such performance is
entirely in accordance with the intention and understanding of the parties, such contract is not within the statute, and need not be in writing,
in order to maintain an action upon it: Blakeney v. Goode, 30 Ohio St.
GUARANTY.
See Surety.
HABEAS CORPUS.

Cannot determine same questions as Writ of Error.-A writ of habeas
corpus applied for by a prisoner on the ground that the place of imprisonment named in the sentence was not that ordered by statute, was refused,
the court declining to pass upon the validity of the sentence until brought
before them by writ of error : IA re .Esther Coffeen, S. C. Mich., Jan.
Term 1S78.
HUSBAND AND 'WIFE.

See Debtor and Creditor.

Proof of .Afarriage-Dower barredb 1 Statnte of Limitations -Conduct and reputation are sufficient proof of marriage in cases involving
property rights: Proctor v. Bigelow, S. C. Mich.; Scott v. Bigelow, Id.,
Jan. Term 1878.
Rights of dower are barred by the Statute of Limitations : Id.
Debts not contracted with direct reference to Sep)arate Estate.-In
order to charge the debts contracted by a married woman upon her separate estate as a lien in equity, it is necessary that it should affirmatively
appear that her contract was made with direct reference to her separate
estate, and that it was her intention to charge the sanme : Wilson v. Jones,
46 Md.
A bill was filed against afeme covert and her trustee for the purpose
of charging her separate estate with a lien for materials furnished by the
complainants for the improvement of the same; the bill did not aver
that there was any contract by her to bind her separate estate, or any
intention on her part to create a charge or specific lien thereon for the
payment of the complainant's claim. On demurrer to the bill, it, was
held, That the bill stated no case entitling the complainants to relief in
equity, and that the demurrer should be sustained: Id.
INSURANCE.

Proofs of Loss-Estoppel-Agen -y-SHpulations
against A !hority
of Agent-7ariationby Paro.-If an insurance company, with notice,
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actual or constructive, of flicts rendering the policy voidable at its option, objects upon other grounds only to proofs of loss furnished, and
subjects the insured to trouble and expense in furnishing new proofs, it
will be estopplcd friom setting up such faets in avoidance of the policy.
And this estoppel arises although such first proofs did not, and the new
proofs do, furnish the company cumulative evidence of the facts relihd
upon as a breach: Gans v. St. Paid P. & _Af.Ins.. Co., 43 Wis.
Knowledge on the part. of the agent of' an insurance company, authorized to issue its policies, of facts which render the contract voidable
at the insurer's option, is knowledge of the company ; and the effect of
such knowledge is not varied by stipulations in the policy, that "the
use of general terms, or anything else than a distinct, specific agreement
clearly expressed and endorsed on the policy, shall not be construed hs
a waiver of any printed or written condition or restriction therein ;" that
the agent " has no authority to waive, modify or strike from the policy
any of its printed conditions;" that his assent to an increase of risk is
not binding upon the company until it is endorsed upon the policy, and
the increased premium paid; and that, in case the policy shall become
void by violation of any condition thereof, the agent has no power to
revive it: Id.
Where A. is authorized by an insurance company to receive applications for and issue its policies, a provision in a policy so issued, that
"any person, other than the assured, who may have procured the insurance to be taken by this company, shall be deemed to be the agent
of the assured, and not of this company under any circumstances whatever, or in any transaction relating to this insurance" cannot substitute
the assured for the company as A.'s principal : id.
A clause in an insurance policy declaring that a waiver of any condi
tion thereof, to be binding, must be endorsed upon it, may itself be
waived by parol, or by acts in pais: Id.
E'idence-Pr1.oofsof Death.-By the terms of a policy of life insu.ance the amount insured was payable in ninety days after satisfactory
proofs of death. At the trial, the proofs of death furnished in compliance with this requirement were offered in evidence by the plaintiff,
for the purpose of showing such compliance. Held, 1st. That the same
were admissible for that purpose and for no other, and their sufficiency
was a question 'for the cc--rt to determine. 2d. That the said proofs
being also offered in evi&ence by the defendant, were admissible as declarations of the plaintiff: Alutual Life Ins Co. v. Stlibbe, 46 Md.
The statement of the plaintiff as to the cause of the death of the
insured, accompanying said premliminary proof, did not properly constitute any part of the proof of death required by the policy, but was
the mere declaration made by her of her opinion and belief as to the
cause of the death, and as such the defendant was entitled to rely upon
it before the jury though not conclusive: Id.
The statement of the physician was, that the disease of which the
insured died, was "cerebral congestion, caused proximately by mental
anxiety and remotely by drink." By the terms of the policy, it was to
be void, "if the death shall be caused by the use of intoxicating drink
or opium." Held, that the meaning of this provision was, that the
things prohibited should be the direct cause of the death, in order to
avoid the policy, and it was not error so to instruct the jury : Id.
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INTERNAL REVENUE LAW.

See Evidence.

LIEN. See l[ortgage.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

See Boundaryi; _hlsband and 1'7'fe.

ConditionalPromise not ,Slficient.-In an action by G. against K. as
executrix, the plaintiff, for the purpose of taking his case out of the
operation of the Statute of Limitations, offered in evidence a letter
addressed to the plaintiff's attorney by the attorney for the defendant,
in these words : " About claim against Mrs. K. please inform ine what
it is. The executrix will pay it if just." tlid:
That said letter was
inadmissible for that purpose : Goldsmith v. Kilbourn, 46 Md.
.Fraud-Statuteruns from Time of Discover.-The Act of 1868, eh.
357, provides, that "In actions hereafter brought where a party has a
cause of action, of which he has been kept in ignorance by the fraud of
the adverse party, the right to bring the suit shall be deemed t) have
first accrued at the time at which such fraud shall, or with usual and
ordinary diligence might have been known or discovered." lhidd, that
it was not thereby meant that in all cases a party must comiit a fraud
distinct from, and independent of the original fraud, for the purpose of
keeping the injured party in ignorance of his cause of action, nor that
the mere concealment of the fraud is insufficient : Wear Y. Skinner, 46
Md.
Where one practises fraud to the injury of another, the subsequent concealment of it from the injured party is in itselfa fraud, and if lie is
thereby kept in ignorance of his cause of action, he is kept in ignorance
by "the fraud of the adverse party :" id.
In an action of deceit brought to recover damages for an alleged fraud,
by which the plaintiff was induced to assign to the defendant his interest
in a firm of which the two had been members; upon a plea of the Statute of Limitations and replication thereto, it was held, that if the plaintiff was induced to assign to the defendant his interest in said firm by
fraud practised on him by the defendant, and such fraud was concealed
from him by the defendant, whereby he was kept in ignorance of his
cause of action, then his right to bring the suit must be deemed to have
first accrued when such fraud was, or with usual and ordinary diligence
might have been discovered: 11.
MORTGAGE.

Of Chattels-Lienof.-Because a mortgagee of a chattel temporarily
uses it with the assent of the mortgagor, and then returns it to him, the
mortgage lien upon it is not thereby extinguished: Albert v. Lindau,
46 Md.
Of Chattels-Possession of Mortgagor-Fraudagainst Creditors.A chattel mortgage and a written agreement to govern the same subjectmatter between the parties, executed contemporaneously, must be treated
as one contract: Blakeslee v. .Rossman, 43 Wis.
Where such a contract mortgages to creditors a merchant's entire
stock of goods, licensing the mortgagor to remain in possession and dispose of the goods in the course of his trade, and apply one-half of the
proceeds of the sales upon his liability to the mortgagees, without making any provision for the disposition of the other half, this in- effect
VoL. XXVI.-52
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leaves such other half at the absolute disposal of the mortgagor for his
own use: Id.
A chattel mortgage permitting the mortgagor to remain in possession,
and to sell and apply the proceeds or any part of them, to his own use,
is fraudulent and void in law as against creditors: Id.
The mortgage itself, as put on record, purported to cover the entire
stock, for money lent to the mortgagor; but the contemporaneous agreemeat, not recorded, shows it to be in effect a mortgage of half the stock,
for indemnity against liabilities assumed by the mortgagees. Quere,
whether such failure of the record to disclose fully the consideration
and nature of the lien would not avoid the mortgage as against creditors : Id.
The mortgage being void in law, as against creditors, in a controversy
between one claiming under it and a creditor of the mortgagor, there is
no question for the jury of good faith in fact : Id.
While the holder of a chattel mortgage may relinquish his rights as
such, and accept the chattels from the mortgagor in payment of his
debt, or as a pledge, such a shifting of title must be open, express and
explicit-both debtor and creditor being expressly parties to the paymeat or pledge, and their acts in that behalf established as expressly
and satisthitorily as payment or pledge in any other case: Id.
jhlushalling Liens-Liens partly valid and partly bad.-In a proceeding at the suit of sundry mortgagees to foreclose their respective
mortgages, it appeared that the wife of the mortgagor had united with
her husband in the execution of only one of the mortgages, in which
she had released her contingent right of dower. At the instance of the
mortgagee holding such release the wife was made a party, and the premises were sold pursuant to an order, free from her contingent claim to
dower: feld, that the mortgagee holding such release is entitled, on
distribution, to receive the proportionate value of such inchoate right
of dower, though the net proceeds of the sale are insufficient to satisfy
the prior mortgages: Adintr of Black v. Kuiman et at., 30 Ohio St.
Where, in marshalling liens, the court awards to a portion of a claim
secured by mortgage, priority over a subsequent mortgage, but finds that
the residue of the claim secured by the prior mortgage is fraudulent and
void, as against the lien of the subsequent mortgage, the partial preference thus given to the elder lien is not necessarily erroneous. Where
no positive illegality enters into the consideration of a claim, it may be
valid in part, and in part invalid : Id.
MUNICIPAL BONDS. See Corporation.
Bonds issued by County-Defence to.-By a law of Nebraska, any
county or city was authorized to issue bonds to aid in the construction
of any railroad or other work of internal improvement, the amount to be
determined by the county commissioners of such county or the city
council of such city, not exceeding ten per cent. of the assessed valuation
of all taxable property in said county or city : Provided, the county
commissioners or city council should first submif the question of issuing
such 'bonds to a vote of the legal voters of said county or city in the
manner provided by chapter nine of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska
for submitting to the people of a county the question of borrowing money.
By a :ubsequent section of the same act it was enacted that any precinct
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in any organized county of the state should have the privilege of voting
to aid works of internal improvement, and be entitled to all the privileges
conferred upon counties and cities ; and that in such eases the precinct
election should be governed in the same inanner'so far as applicable,
and the county comnmissioners should issue special bonds for the precinct:
County Commissioners of Dodge Co. v. Chandler, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1877.
An action was brought to recover the amount of certain coupons attached to certain bonds issued by the board of county commissioners of
the county of Dodge, on behalf of the precinct of Fremont in said
county. The plaintiff purchased the coupons sued on befbre maturity,
and for a valuable consideration. It was conceded that the precinct
regularly voted for an issue of bonds to the amount named therein, to
be appropriated for building a bridge across the Platte river, which fiet
was recited in said bonds; but the defendant in its answer set forth
the notice of the election, by which it appeared that the proIposition
submitted to the people was to build a toll-bridge, and not a free bridge;
and that the bridge was accordingly built, and operated as a toll-bridge.
The notice of election further declared that the tolls were to be used for
the purpose of raising a sinking fund to pay the principal, interest, repairs aud expenses of the bridge, and were to be regulated from time to
time by the county commissioners. The plaintiff demurred to this
answer: Held, that the fact that the bonds were issued for a toll-bridge
of the character of the one set forth in the proposition submitted to the
votes of said Fremont precinct, as shown in the answer, did not make
them invalid in the hands of a holder thereof for value, befbre due,
without other notice than that imparted on the face of the bonds: Id.
All bridges, intended and used as thoroughfares, are public highways
whether subject to toll or not: Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

Obstruction .of Alley - Violation of Municipal Ordinance- !Itle to
Easement-Purpose of Alleys.-The object of the power granted to a
city to prevent obstruction to various easements of a public character is
not to settle the title, which cannot be tried by a municipal court under
city ordinances: Beecher v. The People, S. C. Mich., Jan. Term 1878.
A summary proceeding cannot be had to prevent an interruption in
the use or enjoyment of a mere theoretical easement not actually used: Id.
A city cannot try as a violation of an ordinance an invasion of its private property : Id.
The purpose of alleys is not as substitutes for streets, but as a means
of accommodation to a limited neighborhood for chiefly local convenience: Id.
Nothing can be treated as a punishable obstruction of an alley that
does not interfere with its accustomed uses. Covering it in by a roof
is not necessarily any obstruction whatever: Id.
NEGLIGENCE.

Action for Damages by falling into an Excavation on a Private Lot
-Right of Way-License by 1mplication-ANisance.-In an action of
damages fbr a personal injury, it was alleged in one of the counts, that
the defendants were owners of a certain open and unenclosed -lot of
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ground, within the limits of the city of Baltimore, and that persons were
in the habit of passing over the same; and that the defendants cut on
such lot in a dangerous and exposed position thereof, a deep excavation,
and left the same in a dangerous condition, and liable to injure persons
passing over the said lot; and that the plaintiff while passing over said
lot on a certain night, being ignorant of the excavation, fell therein and
was injured. On demurrer, it was held, 1st. That said count entirely
fails to state a sufficient cause of action. 2d. That the fact that per:ons
were in the habit of passing over the lot gave the plaintiff no right to do
so; and unless there were such right, there was no breach of duty on
the part of the defendants in cutting and leaving open the excavation.
3d. That a party has the right to use his land as he pleases, except as
he may be restrained by duty to the pufblic or to private individuals:
Maenner v. Carroll,46 Md.
NOTICE.
NUISANCE.

See Covenant.
See N-egligence.

PARENT AND CHILD.

See Assumj~sit.

PARTNERSHIP.

Surviving Partner-Powerto giee Kote in Firm's vame.-After the
dissolution of a firni by the death of a partner, one surviving partner has
no implied power to bind another-who, since the death, has shown no
assent to the continuance of the business in the old name-by a note
given in the name of the late firm, even for an acknowledged indebtedness accruing befbre the firm's dissolution: .Matteson et al. v. .athanson,
S. C. Mich., Jan. Term 1878.
Retiring Partner-Liabilifyof.-A retiring partner remains liable
for all the existing debts of the firm, to the same extent as if he had not
retired. An agreement between him and the remaining partners, or
with the new firm that succeeds, that they will assume and pay all such
debts, while valid as between the partners, has no effect upon the creditors of the old firm, unless they become partners thereto: Rawson v.
Taylor, 30 Ohio St.
It. held the promissory note of the firm of T. G. & Co. After it was
given, some members of the firm retired, leaving assets sufficient to pay
all debts, and taking the obligation of the succeeding new firm, to pay
all debts and save the retiring partners harmless :- .eld, that unless R.,
by some valid contract, express or implied, had made himself a party to
this new arrangement, or had so acted as to be estopped, his rights on
the note against all the members of the old firm remained unchanged;
that while, as between the partners themselves, the relation of principal
and surety existed, yet as to the payee of the note, all were principals
and joint debtors, although notice of such obligation was brought home
to him: Id.
Where the payee of such note has received from the new firm a chattel mortgage of the partnership property sufficient, if applied, to satisfy
the debt, he may, with the assent of the retiring partners, release the
mortgage, and return the property or its avails to the new firm, without
impairing his rights against all the joint obligors on the note, even though
he had such notice of the subsequent contract between the partners:
.d.
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PATENT.

What Assignments of are required to be in Writing-,Jhrisdictionof
State Courts.-The interest in a patent to the transfer of which writing
is necessary, under sect. 11 of the Act of 1836, is an interest in the
legal title of the patent. An equitable interest or an interest in the
proceeds resulting from sales of the patent, with a right to an account,
need not be in writing: Blakeney v. Goode, '0 Ohio St.
Although a cause of action may relate to the subject-matter of a patent right, it is within the jurisdiction of state courts, if it does not involve the validity of the patent right: Id
SLANDER.

harge of burning Property to defraud Insurers-Aggravation of
.Damages- Opinion of Officer-Eidence of 1'ublic Rumors-fitigation of Damages.-In an action for slander in charging plaintiff with
having burned his property to defraud the insurers, proof of actual
insurance is not necessary, the fact being immaterial : Fowler v. Gilbert, S. C. Mich. Jan. Term 1878.
Charges made to plaintiff himself of the same slanderous nature as
those counted on, are admissible in evidence in aggravation of damages,
whether made to him alone or in presence of others : id.
Alleged frauds of plaintiff against third persons concerning agreements regarding insurance, are irrelevant : 1d.
The opinion entertained by a public officer as to the cause of a fire,
is inadmissible in an action of slander brought by one charged with
making it to defraud insurers : JR.
The effect of evidence of public rumors against the plaintiff on the
subject of the slander, is properly confined to mitigation of damages:
Id.
SURETY.

Evidence-Judgment Record-Motice to Guarantor of default by
Principal.-In an action against a surety, the record of a judgment
against his principal, unless shown to be on account of matters connected
with his guaranty, is inadmissible. But where the record shows a liability embraced by the guaranty of the surety, it is primafacie evidence
for that purpose : Roberts v. Woven Wire Mattress Co., 46 DId.
Where a party has given a bond to another to secure the faithful performance of the contract of a third person, it is the duty of the obligee
to give reasonable notice to the guarantor of any defalcation on the part
of the contractor. It is the prerogative of the court to define the character of the notice, and the duty of the jury to determine whether such
reasonable notice has been given : Id.
Where a guaranty is subsequent to the contract between the principal
and the guarantee, and forms no part of the consideration thereof, it requires a distinct consideration to give it efficacy as a collateral undertaking: Id.
But where a guaranty expressly referred to a previous agreement
between the principal and the guarantee, which was executory in its
character, and embraced prospective dealings between the parties, then
the guaranty purports upon its face and by necessary construction a
sufficient consideration: Id.

